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Abstract
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives ben-
efits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort,
which has no intrinsic value.
The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilib-
rium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts
strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can com-
pensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type.
The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending
on which type the receivers expect to send it.
JEL classification: D82, D83, C73.
Keywords: Dynamic games, signalling, incomplete information
1. Introduction
In many signalling situations, the sender exerts effort over time, and the
observation of that effort is noisy. For example, a politician may be a (relatively)
honest or a corrupt type, and can signal honesty by following the law to the
letter (paying taxes in full, refraining from speeding and bribe-taking). Whereas
the politician incurs the cost of obeying the law at all points of time, voters learn
of low effort only after the realisation of a random event, such as a scandal. The
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about this research. Numerous conversations with Larry Samuelson have helped improve the
paper. The author is grateful to Eduardo Faingold, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Va¨lima¨ki, Philipp
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acknowledged.
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honest type has a lower cost of obeying the law. The honest type acts in the
public interest in important matters, but the corrupt type does not. The voters
care about decisions in important matters, but not directly about whether the
politician obeys the law in everyday life.
As a consequence of the multiple opportunities of exerting effort, novel dy-
namics of behaviour arise. For example, there exist equilibria in which the
high-cost type chooses a strictly higher effort level initially than the low-cost
type.
In the model, the players are a sender and a competitive market of receivers.
The sender is either a high-cost or a low-cost type. The type is private informa-
tion. Receivers share a common prior belief about the type. The sender contin-
uously chooses his effort level. Receivers observe noisy public signals about the
effort, rather than the effort itself. The signal process is Poisson with intensity
decreasing in effort. The types only differ in their flow cost of effort. The sender
derives a flow benefit directly from the posterior belief of the receivers.
Attention is restricted to equilibria that are Markovian (the belief of the
receivers is the state variable) and stationary, which means that behaviour does
not depend on calendar time. Such equilibria exist, because minimal effort by
all types in all circumstances is a Markovian and stationary equilibrium and
always exists.
In some parameter regions, there exist equilibria in which first one type ex-
erts higher effort and then the other. These are called switched effort equilibria,
because initially the ordering of the efforts of the types is the opposite to that
found in the previous literature on signalling. The concept of a switched effort
equilibrium can be illustrated by the example of the politician given above. In
this example, the politician can be honest or corrupt and can exert effort to obey
the law. Lawful behaviour decreases the frequency of scandals. A switched effort
equilibrium can be described in terms of four regimes, which are referred to as
early career, insider, scrutiny and tainted. Play starts in the early career, dur-
ing which the corrupt type exerts positive effort and the honest type no effort.
If no scandal occurs by a given time, then the politician becomes an insider,
which means that the voters ignore scandals and the politician no longer exerts
effort. If, instead, a scandal occurs in the early career, then scrutiny results.
Under scrutiny, the honest type exerts maximum effort and the corrupt type
none. Under scrutiny, a scandal leads to a tainted reputation, which means that
voters believe the politician to be corrupt with higher probability than in the
other regimes, and the politician exerts no effort. The path of play in switched
effort equilibria is depicted in Fig. 1 below.
In the early career regime of switched effort equilibria, a signal has the
opposite meaning to that in the other regimes.2 If the low-cost type is more
2One example of a scandal increasing popularity is Bill Clinton, whose approval rating rose
from 63% on 15 Dec 1998 to 73% on 20 Dec. The House of Representatives passed two articles
of impeachment in that period. Toronto mayor Rob Ford’s approval rating rose from 39% on
28 Oct 2013 to 44% on 1 Nov. Between these dates, police chief Bill Blair confirmed a video
of Ford smoking crack cocaine.
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Figure 1: A switched effort equilibrium.
likely to generate a particular signal, then this signal is evidence of low cost,
whereas if the high-cost type becomes more likely to send it, then the signal
suggests high cost to the receivers.
The voters do not care directly about the part of the politician’s behaviour
that leads to scandals (sex life, drug use, tax evasion), but care about the
politician’s unobservable decisions on issues important to the country. The
voters assume that a politician’s tendency for scandalous behaviour in matters
that have no direct impact on the public is positively correlated with a tendency
of corrupt decisions in areas where these cause real damage. These combined
tendencies are called a corrupt type. The voters cannot observe the decisions
that affect them, so they use scandals to update their belief about the likelihood
of honesty in such decisions.
The politician derives a flow benefit from the voters’ belief, which can be jus-
tified by a randomly arriving election. This arrival is exogenous to the politician
if he is not the head of government and cannot call a snap election. Because of
the chance of an election, belief at each future instant has a positive probability
of mattering for the politician’s career. Alternatively, the politician may derive
ego rents from being popular with the public.
1.1. Literature
Signalling is used to explain phenomena as diverse as education (Spence,
1973), conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899) and issuing equity (Leland and
Pyle, 1977). Many authors have mentioned the relevance of time (Weiss, 1983;
Admati and Perry, 1987) and noise (Matthews and Mirman, 1983) in signalling
contexts. The conclusion of the previous literature is that in all equilibria, the
high-cost type exerts weakly less effort than the low-cost. This result fails to
hold only in models that depart from pure Spence signalling, e.g. by adding
exogenous information revelation and more than two types as in Feltovich et al.
(2002). Introducing noise (Matthews and Mirman, 1983) or repetition (No¨ldeke
and van Damme, 1990; Swinkels, 1999) has not been shown to switch the efforts
of the types in pure signalling. Similarly, such switching of efforts has not
been found to arise in models that incorporate both dynamics and imperfect
monitoring (Daley and Green, 2012; Gryglewicz, 2009; Dilme, 2014).
In Dilme (2014), signalling in continuous time is obscured by Brownian noise.
The sender (an entrepreneur) decides how much costly effort to exert over time,
as well as when to stop the game (sell the firm) and receive a final benefit. This
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contrasts with the present paper, in which benefit accumulates continuously
and the sender cannot stop the receivers from learning. Dilme (2014) studies
the efficiency of equilibrium effort provision and finds that effort is too low and
stops too early. The present paper examines the endogenous switching of the
efforts of the types, which is not alluded to in the previous literature, including
Dilme (2014).
In Daley and Green (2012), the uninformed traders receive information (ob-
servations of a diffusion process) exogenously over time, and the informed trader
decides when to stop the game (execute the trade) and receive a final payoff.
Gryglewicz (2009) examines limit pricing over time. The low-cost incumbent is
a commitment type and the high-cost incumbent decides when to stop imitating
the low-cost type. Unlike Daley and Green (2012), the present paper models an
endogenous signal. Moreover, the present paper differs from Gryglewicz (2009)
in that both types are strategic. The situation described is one in which payoffs
accrue continuously or a lump-sum arrives at an exogenous exponentially dis-
tributed time. In contrast, the other papers model a stopping decision by the
sender that triggers a payoff. Neither Daley and Green (2012) nor Gryglewicz
(2009) refers to switched efforts or interpretations of a signal.
The present paper is also related—albeit less closely—to the literature on
repeated noiseless signalling (No¨ldeke and van Damme, 1990; Swinkels, 1999).
In these models, time is discrete, there is no noise, and the sender pays the sig-
nalling cost first and receives the benefit only upon deciding to stop signalling
forever. For example, the completion of a traditional education can be modelled
in this way—the salary is received only after graduating. In the current paper,
the benefit is received concurrently with the payment of the cost, as when a
worker takes continuing education courses while being employed, or a firm ad-
vertises while selling its product. No¨ldeke and van Damme (1990) find a unique
informative equilibrium. Using different informational assumptions, Swinkels
(1999) finds a unique pooling equilibrium. The models in the current paper
have many informative equilibria and one pooling equilibrium. In No¨ldeke and
van Damme (1990) and Swinkels (1999), the low-cost type always exerts weakly
more effort than the high-cost. While this feature of their models is in line with
previous signalling research, it stands in contrast with the current work.
Discrete-time repeated signalling is also studied in Kaya (2009) and Roddie
(2012). In their models, there is no noise in the observation of the sender’s
action, whereas in the present paper this observation is noisy. Kaya (2009)
focuses on least-cost separating equilibria. Roddie (2012) provides general con-
ditions for reputation effects to arise. Neither paper mentions the possibility of
switched efforts, which are the focus of the current paper.
It is, in fact, easier to construct switched effort equilibria without noise, on
account of the availability of belief threats. The author is not aware, however,
of any papers in which this has been done. Using belief threats or ad hoc
refinements invites the suspicion that switched efforts are driven by unrealistic
beliefs. This concern is addressed in the current work by using noise, so that
Bayes’ rule applies after all histories. Similarly, non-Markov strategies can be
used to create strange behaviour, but this paper stacks the deck against unusual
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results by focussing on Markov stationary equilibria. This serves to strengthen
the result that effort switching is possible.
Switched effort equilibria could not be studied with existing noisy signalling
models, which use either discrete time or Brownian noise. Discrete time with
noise makes equilibrium calculation intractable. Brownian noise is incompatible
with switched efforts3 and is less tractable than Poisson for the models in this
paper.
Switched efforts are reminiscent of the countersignalling of Feltovich et al.
(2002), but the mechanism driving them is quite different, as is the model.
The switched effort equilibria of this paper use dynamics, while Feltovich et al.
(2002) present a one shot model. In the current paper, there is no exogenous
information revelation and there are only two types, in contrast to Feltovich
et al. (2002). In countersignalling, the lowest-cost type can rely on the exogenous
signal to partly distinguish him from the highest-cost. Moreover, he may exert
less effort than the medium type in order to differentiate himself from that type.
The effort of the lowest-cost type cannot be less than that of the highest-cost
type. In the present paper, it is the threat of future information revelation that
incentivises the high-cost type to signal. This threat is not as severe for the
low-cost type, leading to strictly less effort.
Cripps et al. (2004) show that, in a wide class of repeated games, if a reputa-
tion for behaviour is not an equilibrium of the complete information stage game,
then that reputation is temporary, and the type must eventually be learned. In
some switched effort equilibria of the present paper, both types face a positive
probability of acquiring a ‘wrong’ permanent reputation in the following sense:
when signalling and belief updating stop, belief about the good type may be
lower than the prior and belief about the bad type higher. In expectation,
beliefs move in the direction of the sender’s type, but mistakes have positive
probability.
2. Setup
The players are a strategic sender and a competitive market. The sender
has a type θ ∈ {G,B}, with G interpreted as the good (low-cost) type and B as
bad (high-cost). The sender knows his type, the market does not. The initial
log likelihood ratio l0 ∈ R of the types is common knowledge. Throughout
this paper, log likelihood ratio l is used instead of belief Pr(G) = exp(l)1+exp(l) , as
this simplifies the formulas in the dynamic models to follow. All results can
be restated in terms of beliefs. A generic log likelihood ratio l is an element
of R = R ∪ {∞,−∞}. The log likelihood ratio corresponding to Pr(G) = 1 is
l =∞ and corresponding to Pr(G) = 0 is l = −∞.
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. The sender chooses signalling
effort et ∈ [0, 1] at each instant of time t. To avoid the technical difficulties
3The proof is available upon request. It uses a coupling argument on the continuous belief
paths.
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of defining behavioural strategies in continuous time, mixing is not allowed.
Effort e costs type θ sender cθ(e), with cθ continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, convex and cθ(0) = 0. Strong single crossing c
′
G(1) < c
′
B(0) is
assumed, which implies the single crossing in type and cost that is standard in
the signalling literature. Strong single crossing means that the marginal cost of
any effort level for the good type is lower than the marginal cost of any effort
for the bad type.
Effort benefits the sender via its effect on the signal process, which drives
the market’s log likelihood ratio process (lt). The sender is assumed to derive
flow benefit β(l) directly from the market’s log likelihood ratio l. Unless noted
otherwise, the function β is assumed to be strictly increasing, bounded and
continuously differentiable. Denote the flow benefit from l =∞ (corresponding
to Pr(G) = 1) by βmax and from l = −∞ by βmin.
In order to provide microfoundations that explain why the market rewards
the sender’s type rather than the effort it expects from the sender, suppose
there are two kinds of effort: effort which is noisily observable and that which is
unobservable. The senders with a low cost of partially observable effort prefer
to exert the unobserved effort, but the high-cost senders prefer not to exert
it. Only the completely unobservable kind of effort matters to the market. The
type is the level of this hidden effort. The partially visible effort is the signalling
activity, which the market does not care about directly.
A pure Markov stationary strategy is a measurable function (eB , eG) : R →
[0, 1]2 that maps the log likelihood ratio to the efforts of the types. The state
variable l is the log likelihood ratio of the market. Formally, the value of the
state variable at time t is the left limit lt− of the log likelihood ratio process
(lt), similarly to Yushkevich (1988). The log likelihood ratio lt is a function of
time. The left limit means that time approaches t from below. This assumption
ensures that the signals are not anticipated by the log likelihood ratio of the
market. Intuitively, the market does not condition on the signal realisation
in the ‘next instant’. The convention l0− = l0 is used for the initial value
of the state variable. Henceforth, only pure Markov stationary strategies are
considered and the ‘pure Markov stationary’ phrase is omitted.
The signal process is Poisson with rate (1−et)λ+d at time t.4 The parameter
λ ∈ (0,∞) is interpreted as the informativeness of effort, while d ≥ 0 is the
minimal rate. The meaning of signals is endogenous—whether a signal raises or
lowers belief about the type depends on the strategy the market expects from
the sender. The same signal can thus have opposite meanings at different log
likelihood ratios. The market observes the signals, but not the sender’s effort
or type. Since the signal process is public, the updated log likelihood ratio is
common knowledge.
4A Poisson rate linear in effort is with some loss of generality, but less than at first seems.
A change of variables eˆ = f−1(e) transforms cost to cθ(f(eˆ)) and the signal rate to (1 −
f(eˆt))λ + d, which may be nonlinear. A strictly increasing convex f preserves the convexity
and the strong single crossing of cost.
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The next part of the setup is the Bayesian updating of the market’s log
likelihood ratio. Denote the strategy the market expects the sender to choose
by e∗ = (e∗G, e
∗
B). This notation is also used for equilibrium strategies. If a
signal occurs at log likelihood ratio l ∈ R, then the log likelihood ratio jumps to
j(l) = l + ln
(
λ(1− e∗G(l)) + d
λ(1− e∗B(l)) + d
)
. (1)
Call |j(l)− l| the jump length. If d = 0, then the fraction in (1) may become 00
for some strategy e∗ that the market expects. In that case, updating uses the
limit of (1) as d ↘ 0. This implies that 00 = 1, and if l = ±∞, then l stays
constant regardless of signals. Note that updating is defined for any e∗, not
just the equilibrium e∗ introduced below. The set of strategies available to the
sender is independent of d. The limit d ↘ 0 is taken for each e∗ separately to
define the overall updating rule that maps e∗ and the signal history to l. The
use of the d↘ 0 limit of Bayes’ rule applies Bayes’ rule to null events.
Belief updating based on Bayes’ rule is summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (e∗G, e
∗
B) be the strategy the market expects. Fix t ≥ 0. Suppose
signals have occurred at τ1, . . . , τn, with 0 ≤ τ1 ≤ . . . ≤ τn ≤ t. Then the log
likelihood ratio at t is
lt = l0 + λ
∫ t
0
[e∗G(ls)− e∗B(ls)] ds+
n∑
k=1
[j(lτk)− lτk ] . (2)
Except for jumps, l evolves deterministically given the market expectations
(e∗B , e
∗
G). Given l at the time of a jump, the jump length is deterministic. The
log likelihood process depends on the chosen effort only via the (random) timing
of the signals τ1, . . . , τn. Lemma 1 applies even if multiple signals occur in the
same instant τi, but this event has zero probability, because the signal process
is Poisson.
If for some lˆ, the strategy features e∗G(l) > e
∗
B(l) for l ∈ (lˆ − , lˆ) and
e∗G(l) < e
∗
B(l) for l ∈ (lˆ, lˆ+ ), then lˆ is a stasis point. A stasis point is described
in more detail in the appendix. It occurs at a point lˆ that has the log likelihood
ratio drift towards lˆ from immediately above and below lˆ. The log likelihood
ratio does not drift away from a stasis point, but may jump away in either
direction.
Given the strategy e∗ = (e∗B , e
∗
G) that the market expects the sender to
choose, the payoff of type θ from actually choosing the effort function eθ(·) is
the expected discounted sum of flow payoffs
Jeθl0 (e
∗) = Eeθ
[∫ ∞
0
exp(−rt) [β(lt)− cθeθ(lt)] dt
∣∣∣∣e∗, lt=0 = l0] , (3)
where the expectation is over the stochastic process (lt)t≥0, given eθ(·). Payoffs
both on and off the equilibrium path are given by (3), depending on whether or
not the eG, eB that maximise (3) for each type satisfy (eG, eB) = (e
∗
G, e
∗
B). The
discount rate is r > 0.
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Given a strategy e∗ that the market expects from the sender, the supremum
of (3) over eθ is denoted Vθ(l0). If the market expects a Markov stationary
strategy, then every time a given l is reached, the continuation value Vθ(l) of
type θ is well defined and independent of the path of (lt) that led to l. The
dependence of Vθ(l) on e
∗ is suppressed in the notation. If e∗G(l) = e
∗
B(l), then
(lt) stays at l forever and Vθ(l) =
∫∞
0
exp(−rt)β(l)dt = β(l)r . Value Vθ(l) is
bounded above by βmaxr and below by
βmin
r .
Definition 1. A Markov stationary equilibrium consists of a strategy e∗ =
(e∗G, e
∗
B) of the sender and a log likelihood ratio process (lt)t≥0 s.t.
1. given (lt)t≥0, e∗θ maximises (3) over eθ,
2. given e∗, (lt)t≥0 is derived from (2).
Henceforth ‘equilibrium’ means a pure Markov stationary equilibrium.
A pooling equilibrium is defined by e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) ∀l. It is clearly Markovian
(independent of past play conditional on l) and stationary (independent of cal-
endar time). A pooling equilibrium exists for all parameter values, because if
e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l), then the log likelihood ratio stays constant forever at l. If a log
likelihood ratio is unresponsive to effort, then there is no benefit to signalling.
This implies that there is no incentive to exert effort at l. The unique best
response is eB(l) = eG(l) = 0. Existence is thus guaranteed for the equilibrium
concept in Def. 1.
The focus in this paper is on equilibria in which e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 for a
nonempty open set of l. In the introduction, such equilibria were called switched
effort equilibria. The introduction also described the path of play of such equi-
libria, which is depicted in Fig. 1.
A switched effort equilibrium cannot be unique, because the pooling equi-
librium always exists. It will be shown below that if one switched equilibrium
exists, then a continuum of such equilibria exist. Refinements cannot be used
to select an equilibrium, because Bayes’ rule applies everywhere, as explained
above.
3. Switched effort equilibria
For some parameter values, there exist equilibria in which, for some log
likelihood ratios of the market, the B type exerts higher effort than G, despite
the uniformly higher marginal cost of effort. The result is reminiscent of the
countersignalling of Feltovich et al. (2002), but the mechanism is quite different.
In this model, it is the threat of future information revelation that incentivises
B to signal. This threat is not as severe for G.
The switched effort pattern e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 is counterintuitive, because
the flow benefit from a higher log likelihood ratio is the same for the types, but
B has a higher marginal cost of signalling. The strong single crossing makes the
result more stark. The switched effort pattern requires VB to decrease at some
l, because if e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l), then j(l) > l and B is paying a cost to avoid jumps.
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For this to be optimal, VB(j(l)) < VB(l) is necessary. The decrease of VB in
l means that the discounted payoff of the B type decreases in the probability
that the receivers assign to him being G.
A switched effort equilibrium is constructed as follows: first, assume that the
appropriate strategy is employed; second, calculate the value functions; finally,
check that the strategy is a best response at every l. A sketch of a switched effort
equilibrium is in Fig. 2, in which the initial log likelihood ratio l0 is assumed
to be in the interval (l, l1). To maximise the duration of switched efforts, let
l0 → l1.
Figure 2: Value functions and strategy in a switched effort equilibrium. Early career regime:
e∗B > e
∗
G = 0, l ∈ (l, l1], insider: e∗B = e∗G = 0, l = l, scrutiny: e∗G = 1, e∗B = 0, l > l1, tainted:
e∗B = e
∗
G = 0, l < l.
l
Vθ
−∞
l
e∗B = e
∗
G = 0 e
∗
B > e
∗
G = 0
no signal l1
e∗G = 1, e
∗
B = 0
no signal
signal
signal
VB
VB
VG
VG
Prop. 2 below provides sufficient conditions for a switched equilibrium to ex-
ist. These involve the value functions, which are endogenous, but all conditions
can be expressed using primitives, as shown subsequently in Prop. 3.
For those values of l at which e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) (the insider and tainted states
in Fig. 1), incentives are trivial, because l does not respond to signals according
to (1). The unique best response, therefore, is eB(l) = eG(l) = 0. The same
reasoning was used above to show the existence of the pooling equilibrium.
It remains to check the log likelihood ratio regions with e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0
(scrutiny in Fig. 1) and e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 (early career in Fig. 1). There are
incentive constraints at each l for both types, but this continuum can be reduced
to just five inequalities, depicted in Fig. 3. There is one inequality for each type
in the scrutiny region; one inequality for G in the early career; and a further
two inequalities for B in the early career.
To check that the best responses are eG(l) = 1, eB(l) = 0 when e
∗
G(l) = 1,
e∗B(l) = 0, it is enough to verify two conditions: (i) G has an incentive to
avoid jumps when the avoidance motive (value before minus after jump) is
minimal; and (ii) B does not have this incentive when the avoidance motive is
maximal. The condition for G to exert maximal effort is Prop. 2 (a) below and
the condition for B to choose zero effort is Prop. 2 (b). These are also shown
in Fig. 3.
9
In the region where e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l), it must be checked that G has no incentive
to avoid jumps and B has neither too much nor too little incentive, so that the
best response of B is interior. Define
V
>
θ = sup {Vθ(l) : e∗B(l) > e∗G(l)} ,
V >θ = inf {Vθ(l) : e∗B(l) > e∗G(l)} ,
V
1
θ = sup {Vθ(l) : e∗G(l) = 1, e∗B(l) = 0} ,
V 1θ = inf {Vθ(l) : e∗G(l) = 1, e∗B(l) = 0} .
The greatest temptation for G to avoid jumps in the early career occurs at the
maximal value V
>
G when jumps go to just above l1 (see Fig. 3). If the difference
between V
>
G and VG(l1) = V
1
G does not incentivise G to exert effort (condition
(c) in Prop. 2), then neither do other VG(l) and VG(j(l)) in these regions.
The equilibrium conditions that determine the effort of B in the early career
are λ[VB(l) − VB(j(l))] = c′B(e∗B(l)) and j(l) = l + λ+dλ(1−e∗B(l))+d . The first is
the FOC for B, ensuring that B is optimising given the jump length. The
second condition determines the jump length given the equilibrium effort e∗B(l),
using e∗G(l) = 0. A sufficient condition for B to choose the equilibrium level of
effort when e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 is as follows: jumps at V
>
B going to V
1
B do not
incentivise B to exert maximal effort (Prop. 2 (d)) and jumps at V >B going to
V 1B do motivate a positive level of effort (Prop. 2 (e)). Then by the Mean Value
Theorem, an interior effort level and jump length can be found such that the
jump is derived from the effort using (1) and the effort is a best response to the
jump.
Figure 3: Incentives in a switched effort equilibrium with d = 0. Prop. 2 (a)–(e) are the
vertical double-ended arrows.
l
Vθ
−∞ l l0 l1 ∞
VB VB
VG
VG
(b)
(a)
(e)
(c)
(d)
Proposition 2. Fix l, l1 ∈ R with l < l1 and fix l ∈ (l1,∞]. If
(a) inf
{
VG(l)− β(j(l))r : l1 ≤ l < l
}
≥ c′G(1)λ ,
(b) sup
{
VB(l)− β(j(l))r : l1 ≤ l < l
}
≤ c′B(0)λ ,
(c) V
>
G − V 1G ≤ c
′
G(0)
λ ,
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(d) V
>
B − V
1
B <
c′B(1)
λ ,
(e) V >B − V 1B ≥ c
′
B(1−d/λ−(λ+d) exp(l−l1)/λ)
λ ,
(f) liml→l j(l) ≤ l,
then there exists an equilibrium in which
e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l ∈ (l, l1],
e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1 if l ∈ (l1, l),
e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l /∈ (l, l).
The proof is in the appendix. The sufficient conditions in Prop. 2 hold even
with the strong single crossing of cost (the marginal cost of B is uniformly higher
than that of G), which makes the result more surprising.
When d = 0 in Prop. 2, the upper bound l of the e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0 region
must be ∞. Otherwise VB(l)− βminr is large enough to induce B to exert effort
at l. If, in the scrutiny region, effort is required forever, then the value of type
B is lowered, which helps to restore incentives.
Conditions (a)–(e) in Prop. 2 have a bound on the marginal benefit of avoid-
ing a jump on the LHS and a bound on the marginal cost per unit of jump
frequency on the RHS. The marginal benefit is the value difference between the
log likelihood ratios before and after a jump. The marginal cost c′θ is evaluated
at a bound on the effort. The rate of jumps absent effort is λ, which is also
the reduction in jump rate per unit of effort. The inequality and the bound on
type θ’s effort in each condition ensure the required effort level. For example,
in (a), the lower bound on the marginal benefit of avoiding a jump is larger
than the marginal cost to G at the maximal effort 1 in the scrutiny region. In
(e), the lower bound on e∗B is not 0, because together with e
∗
G = 0, this would
make jump length zero. Instead, the lower bound 1− dλ − λ+dλ exp(l− l1) on e∗B
ensures that the jumps from the early career region land in the scrutiny region.
The maximal jump length necessary for this is l1 − l. Condition (f) in Prop. 2
ensures that jumps end in a region where the value function can be calculated
in closed form, which is technically convenient.
Prop. 2 is useful for checking incentives after numerically calculating the
candidate value functions. In the region of l where e∗G(l) < e
∗
B(l), the value
functions cannot in general be found in closed form. Numerical simulations must
be used. Fig. 4 displays a numerical example of a switched effort equilibrium.
Belief µ = exp(l)1+exp(l) is used on the x-axis instead of l, in order to display Vθ(l)
at all l. The y-axis has log scale. The prior probability of G is 0.6 at the start
of the early career (l0 = ln(1.5)). Insider status is attained when belief µ has
fallen to 0.4, i.e. l = ln
(
2
3
)
.
Relaxing the assumptions on β to bounded and weakly increasing, for some
β the value functions can be found in closed form. Such β can be chosen to
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Figure 4: A switched effort equilibrium with β(l) =
exp(l)
exp(l)+exp(4.2)
, cG(e) =
e
10
, cB(e) =
200e
201
,
d = 0, r = 1
100
, λ = 2. Blue dashed line: VG, purple line: VB , black line: e
∗
B .
make the switched effort region unboundedly large (in belief space, from  to
1−  for any  ∈ (0, 12 )).5
The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for a switched effort equi-
librium in terms of primitives. The value functions are replaced with their closed
forms when e∗B , e
∗
G ∈ {0, 1}, but bounded by parameters otherwise. The bound-
ing makes the results less tight than in Prop. 2. Parts (a)–(f) in Prop. 3 and
Prop. 2 correspond, in the sense that each inequality in Prop. 3 is a bound on
the respective inequality in Prop. 2. The intuition for Prop. 3 (and Prop. 6 to
follow) is thus the same as for Prop. 2, discussed above and illustrated in Fig. 3.
Proposition 3. Fix l, l1 ∈ R with l < l1. If
(a)
∫∞
l1
β(z)−cG(1)
λ exp
(−r z−lλ ) dz − βminr ≥ c′G(1)λ ,
(b) βmaxr+λ +
λβmin
r(r+λ) − βminr ≤ c
′
B(0)
λ ,
(c) β(l)r −
∫∞
l1
β(z)−cG(1)
λ exp
(−r z−lλ ) dz < c′G(0)λ ,
(d) β(l)r −
[
βmax
r+λ +
λβmin
r(r+λ)
]
<
c′B(1)
λ ,
(e) β(l)r −
∫∞
l1
[
β(z)
λ +
βmin
r
]
exp
(−(r + λ) z−lλ ) dz > c′B(1−exp(l−l1))λ ,
(f) d = 0,
then there exists l0 ∈ (l, l1) and an equilibrium in which
e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l ∈ (l, l0],
5Example available upon request.
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e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1 if l ∈ [l1,∞),
e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l /∈ (l, l0] ∪ [l1,∞).
The proof is in the appendix.
Prop. 3 requires d = 0, so there exists an effort level making the signal rate
zero. Prop. 6 in the appendix covers the case d > 0, so jump length is uniformly
bounded. The expressions become more complicated, but the idea is the same
as in Prop. 3.
Whenever one switched effort equilibrium exists, there is a continuum of
them: if the endpoints of the switched effort region are shifted slightly and if
e∗B(l) is adjusted to ensure that (A.2) in the appendix holds, then the result is
again an equilibrium. More formally, the sufficient conditions in Prop. 3 and
Prop. 6 hold in a nonempty open set of parameters.
If d > 0, then the log likelihood ratio never reaches ±∞, so type is never
learned with certainty. There is a positive probability that when learning ends,
either the B type has reached l > l0 or G has reached l < l0, so a possibility
exists of a ‘wrong’ permanent reputation.
3.1. Other equilibria
Equilibria in which B exerts minimal effort and G maximal in some inter-
val, outside which both types exert minimal effort are called extremal effort
equilibria. Extremal efforts occur in the scrutiny region of switched effort equi-
libria. Sufficient conditions for the existence of extremal effort equilibria are
parts (a),(b) of Prop. 2 or of the subsequent Propositions. Value functions are
given in closed form in the appendix in (A.3).
If d = 0, then the scrutiny region (where e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1) may extend
from some l1 ∈ R to ∞, as seen in Prop. 3 (a),(b). The larger the log likeli-
hood ratio becomes, the greater the incentive to exert effort. This differs from
the literature on signalling with Brownian noise, where efforts are highest for
intermediate beliefs and go to zero as type becomes certain. The reason is that
belief responds less to the Brownian signal when less uncertainty remains about
the type. In the current paper, the effort incentive is determined by the jump
length. Jumps go from l to −∞ when d = 0, e∗B(l) = 0 and e∗G(l) = 1.
If d > 0, then the scrutiny region is bounded above and below, as shown in
Lemma 4, which is proved in the appendix. Efforts are greatest at intermediate
beliefs and go to zero as the market becomes certain of the type.
Lemma 4. If d > 0, then sup {l : e∗B(l) = 0, e∗G(l) = 1} <∞ and
inf {l : e∗B(l) = 0, e∗G(l) = 1} > −∞.
Equilibria in which e∗G(l) = e
∗
B(l) > 0 for some l do not exist, because the
log likelihood ratio does not respond to signals when e∗G(l) = e
∗
B(l). Both types
will then save cost by minimising effort. This completes the characterisation
of equilibria in which e∗G(l), e
∗
B(l) ∈ {0, 1}. Such equilibria are either extremal
effort or pooling on 0. Equilibria with interior efforts e∗G(l) ∈ (0, 1) or e∗B(l) ∈
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(0, 1) are more difficult to characterise. The results about these (other than
switched effort equilibria) are summarised next.
There are no equilibria in which e∗G(l) < e
∗
B(l) in a positive-length interval
[la, lb], and e
∗
G(l) = e
∗
B(l) = 0 for l > lb. The endpoint lb must be finite, because
the incentives require VB to decrease over the course of the jump. If jumps up
continue indefinitely, then the flow benefit keeps increasing, so VB increases.
The incentives require the value functions after a jump to be strictly ordered:
VG(j(l)) > VB(j(l)). If the jump ends at j(l) with e
∗
G(j(l)) = e
∗
B(j(l)) = 0, as
occurs from close to the right endpoint lb of [la, lb], then VG(j(l)) = VB(j(l)) =
β(l)
r , a contradiction. The scrutiny region of switched effort equilibria is thus
indispensable.
If the cost functions are linear, then there are no equilibria in which 1 >
e∗G(l) > e
∗
B(l) ≥ 0 in an interval [la, lb] of positive length, with e∗G(l) = e∗B(l) = 0
elsewhere. Linearity of cost requires indifference between efforts 0, 1 at l for
e∗θ(l) ∈ (0, 1). The value at l is then the same as when the chosen effort eθ(l) is
zero, but the receivers expect the equilibrium efforts 1 > e∗G(l) > e
∗
B(l) ≥ 0. This
holds at all l ∈ [la, lb]. If the chosen effort is zero everywhere, then the payoffs
to the types are identical everywhere. Therefore VG(l) = VB(l) at all l. In
particular, VG(j(l))−VG(l) = VB(j(l))−VB(l). Then the strong single crossing
of the cost functions precludes both types from being indifferent between efforts
0, 1 simultaneously. The result extends to convex costs that are uniformly close
to linear functions, because the model is continuous in the parameters.
If d = 0 and the cost functions are linear, then there are no equilibria in
which e∗B(l) ∈ (0, 1) and e∗G(l) = 1 for l in an interval (la, lb) of positive length.
The log likelihood ratio would jump to −∞ from (la, lb), so if B is indifferent
between efforts 0, 1 at lc ∈ (la, lb), then B strictly prefers 0 at any l < lc and 1
at any l > lc.
3.2. Exogenous information revelation
Switched effort equilibria also exist for some parameter values when the
Poisson rate of jumps is λ(1−eθ)+dθ for type θ, where dG 6= dB and dG, dB > 0.
In this case, if the efforts of the types are the same, then the signal is informative
and l still moves. Pooling equilibria may not exist, because l responding to
signals may motivate the sender to exert effort. The possibility of switched
efforts with exogenous information revelation is less surprising than in the pure
signalling case, because the countersignalling result of Feltovich et al. (2002)
uses exogenous info. The mechanism of countersignalling relies on there being
at least three types. This paper has two types, so the mechanism for switched
efforts is distinct from countersignalling.
The value functions will be proved jointly continuous in dG and dB , so if
the assumptions of Prop. 2 hold strictly, then there is a nonempty open set of
dG, dB for which there exists a switched effort equilibrium.
Proposition 5. If Prop. 2 (a)–(f) hold strictly, then there exists δ > 0 s.t. for
any 0 < dG < dB with |dθ − d| < δ, there exists a switched effort equilibrium.
14
The proof is in the appendix. If dG < dB and e
∗
G(l) = e
∗
B(l), then l drifts up
and jumps down.
A similar result to Prop. 5 can be derived with dG > dB . This is a less
intuitive assumption, because the G type is disadvantaged in the signal, but
advantaged in the cost. If dG > dB and e
∗
G(l) = e
∗
B(l), then the drift of l goes
down and the jumps up. Switched effort equilibria are still continuous in |dθ−d|.
3.3. Robustness
A continuity argument analogous to Prop. 5 shows that switched effort equi-
libria exist when the signal structure is a Le´vy process in which the dominant
component is the Poisson process considered in the benchmark model in Sec-
tion 2.
Adding more types with a two-peaked distribution is expected to yield results
similar to the two-type case. Again, this follows from the continuity of the value
functions in the prior. The state variable (distribution over types) then becomes
multidimensional, which complicates the analysis.
If the benefit depends to a small extent on the true type, the signal, the actual
effort or the effort the market expects from the sender, then the equilibrium is
again continuous in the extent of the influence of these factors.
If the environment is modified so that the benefit depends partly on the
effort the market expects, then the model becomes somewhat similar to the
career concerns situation considered in Holmstro¨m (1999). The remaining con-
ceptual difference between the present paper and Holmstro¨m (1999) is that, in
the present paper, the sender knows his type. If the sender does not know his
type, then all types choose the same effort, so switched efforts are impossible.
A more radical departure from the current model is to make the benefit
depend only on the effort the market expects. Suppose the market expects a
strategy consisting of switched efforts on (l, l1], efforts e
∗
G(l) > e
∗
B(l) for (l1, l),
and pooling elsewhere. This strategy is similar to the one in Prop. 5. If the
market expects this strategy, then the benefit at any l ∈ (l, l) increases in
dB − dG, and is zero when dB = dG. With a large enough dB − dG, it may
be possible to construct a switched effort equilibrium according to the pattern
used above, but its existence cannot be guaranteed based on the continuity of
Vθ alone. This existence question is left for future research.
4. Noiseless switched efforts
Equilibria in which B exerts more effort than G for some belief can be
constructed in noiseless discrete time signalling using belief threats. This is less
surprising than the existence of a switched effort equilibrium with full-support
noise, because the noise forces Bayes’ rule to apply everywhere. To the author’s
knowledge, the possibility of switched efforts in pure signalling models (that have
no exogenous information revelation) has not been suggested in the literature.
Such equilibria may exist in other models, but other authors have not mentioned
it.
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In this model, time is discrete and the horizon infinite. The types are θ =
G,B. The initial log likelihood ratio is l0. Each period, the sender chooses
effort e ∈ R+, which the receivers observe and use to update their log likelihood
ratio. The per-period payoff is β(l)− cˆθ · e for type θ, with β(l) = exp(l)1+exp(l) (risk
neutral sender) and cˆB > cˆG > 0. The discount factor is δ.
In the equilibrium constructed, during the first period, B chooses e0 > 0,
while G puts probability qG ∈ (0, 1) on e0 and 1− qG on 0. After e0 is publicly
observed in the first period, both types choose e = 0 forever. After 0 is seen in
the first period, B exerts zero effort forever, but G chooses e1 > 0 forever. The
log likelihood ratio does not respond to deviations after e0. After 0 in the first
period, as long as e1 has occurred every period, l = ∞. A deviation from e1
after 0 in the first period is followed by l = −∞ and zero effort forever. This
is the belief threat that sustains effort by G under scrutiny. Any actions not
specified above are punished with l = −∞ forever.
After 0 is seen in the first period, the constraints for G to choose e1 and B
to choose 0 are βmax − cˆGe1 ≥ βmin ≥ βmax − cˆBe1. The constraint for B to
exert e0 in the first period is
1
1− δ
qG exp(l0)
1 + qG exp(l0)
− cˆBe0 ≥ βmax + δ
1− δ βmin.
For G to be indifferent between 0 and e0 in the first period, it must be that
1
1− δ
qG exp(l0)
1 + qG exp(l0)
− cˆGe0 = βmax + δ
1− δ (βmax − cˆGe1).
Take δ = 910 , cG = 1, cB = 2, l0 = 0. The above constraints hold for e0 =
1
2 ,
qG =
1
3 and e1 =
9
10 . This constitutes a switched effort equilibrium. Such
equilibria exist for a nonempty open set of parameter values.
In this model, it is not possible that B exerts more effort than G with
probability one, because then high effort would reveal B, yielding the minimal
flow payoff thereafter. Then B would deviate to the lowest effort level that the
market expects from G. Full separation cannot occur via switched efforts.
Adding noise makes discrete time repeated signalling intractable, because
the state variable (log likelihood ratio) then takes values in an infinite discrete
set that is not a regular grid. Neither differential nor difference equations can
be used.
5. Conclusion
Repeating pure signalling permits equilibria in which the high-cost type
exerts more effort than the low-cost for some beliefs of the receivers. These
equilibria are numerous and occur both with and without noise, fully revealing
signals or exogenous information revelation. To the author’s knowledge, the
literature has not alluded to the possibility of such equilibria in a pure signalling
context.
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Higher signalling effort by the high-cost types can be interpreted as a sign
of insecurity—they are trying to avoid future information revelation and effort.
Intuitively, the weak act tough to deter attack, because they know they could
not handle it. Similarly, the guilty avoid an investigation. The low-cost types
know that they can compensate in the future for current low effort, should such
compensation be necessary. They also know that future information revelation
is likely to be good for them.
Switched effort equilibria overturn one of the key intuitions from previous
signalling models. A good signal can go bad and then become good again,
meaning that the same observation may raise belief at one point of the game
and lower it at another. Single crossing in type and cost does not carry over
to single crossing in type and action. In fact, at some point in the game, effort
levels are ordered in the exact reverse order to that commonly found in the
literature. This result does not appear in countersignalling, where the high
types pool with the low and separate from the medium types.
Effort and cost are spread more equally across types in a switched effort
equilibrium than with standard separation, because the bad type also exerts
positive effort. If signalling has a positive externality (outside the scope of the
current model, e.g. education is good for civil society) and the social benefit
from the externality outweighs its cost, then it may be encouraged as a matter
of policy. Fairness considerations may then imply a preference for switched
efforts, e.g. to lead the low-ability workers to acquire at least a minimum of
education. Switched effort equilibria spread the cost more evenly than extremal
efforts, but less evenly than pooling. However, the zero education in pooling
may be undesirable, leaving switched efforts as the best compromise.
Appendix A.
Proof of Prop. 2. Condition (f) implies that if e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0, then
e∗G(j(l)) = e
∗
B(j(l)) = 0. This implies Vθ(j(l)) =
β(j(l))
r .
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for type θ is
rVθ(l) = β(l) + λ [e
∗
G(l)− e∗B(l)]V ′θ (l) (A.1)
+ max
e
{[λ(1− e) + d] [Vθ (j(l))− Vθ(l)]− cθ(e)} .
The best response solves λ [Vθ(l)− Vθ (j(l))] = c′θ(e) if interior. Corner solutions
for the best response are given by
eθ(l) =
{
0 if λ [Vθ(l)− Vθ (j(l))] ≤ c′θ(0),
1 if λ [Vθ(l)− Vθ (j(l))] ≥ c′θ(1).
(A.2)
A verification theorem (Theorem 4.6 in Presman et al. (1990) as modified for
the discounted case in Yushkevich (1988)) is used to check that the solutions
of (A.1) coincide with the value functions.
In the e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0 region, condition (a) implies VG(l)− VG (j(l)) ≥
c′G(1)
λ for all l, because VG(l) ≥ V 1G and VG(j(l)) = β(j(l))r . In turn, VG(l) −
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VG (j(l)) ≥ c
′
G(1)
λ implies eG(l) = 1 based on (A.2). Therefore condition (a)
suffices for eG(l) = 1 ∀l in the region with e∗G(l) = 1, e∗B(l) = 0.
Condition (b) implies VB(l) − VB (j(l)) ≤ c
′
B(0)
λ , because VB(l) ≤ V
1
B and
VB(j(l)) =
β(j(l))
r . In turn, VB(l) − VB (j(l)) ≤ c
′
B(0)
λ implies eB(l) = 0 based
on (A.2). Therefore condition (b) suffices for eB(l) = 0 ∀l in the region with
e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0.
If e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0, then lime∗B(l)→1 j(l) = l + lime∗B(l)→1 ln
1+d
1−e∗B(l)+d ≥ l
by (1) and (f). In the equilibrium constructed, e∗B(l) is chosen in the e
∗
B(l) >
e∗G(l) = 0 region to ensure the jumps end in the e
∗
G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0 region
(formally e∗G(j(l)) = 1, e
∗
B(j(l)) = 0). Condition (c) implies VG(l)− VG (j(l)) ≤
c′G(0)
λ , which in turn implies eG(l) = 0 based on (A.2). Therefore condition (c)
suffices for eG(l) = 0 ∀l in the region with e∗B(l) > e∗G(l) = 0.
To show that (d) and (e) imply the existence of an equilibrium level of e∗B(l)
at each l in the e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 region, first the candidate value functions in
the e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0 region are calculated. Substituting e
∗
B(l) = eB(l) = 0
and e∗G(l) = eG(l) = 1 into each type’s HJB equation and solving the resulting
ordinary differential equations (ODEs) yields
VG(l) = exp
(
− (r + d)(l − l)
λ
)
VG(l)
+
∫ l
l
[
β(z)− cG(1)
λ
+
β(j(z))d
rλ
]
exp
(
− (r + d)(z − l)
λ
)
dz, (A.3)
VB(l) = exp
(
−(r + λ+ d) l − l
λ
)
VB(l)
+
∫ l
l
[
β(z)
λ
+
(λ+ d)β(j(z))
rλ
]
exp
(
−(r + λ+ d)z − l
λ
)
dz,
where j(z) = z+ln
(
d
λ+d
)
. If l is finite, then value matching gives liml→l Vθ(l) =
Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r , which provides the boundary condition for the ODEs in (A.3).
By (A.3), Vθ is strictly increasing in l, so V
1
θ = Vθ(l1) and V
1
θ = liml→l Vθ(l).
The limit is relevant when l =∞, in which case liml→l Vθ(l) < βmaxr , as can be
seen from (A.3).
Given conditions (a)–(c) and (f), e∗B(l) in the region with e
∗
B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0
is part of an equilibrium iff
λ
[
Vθ(l)− Vθ
(
l +
λ+ d
λ(1− e∗B(l)) + d
)]
= c′θ(e
∗
B(l)). (A.4)
This condition merely says e∗B(l) is a best response to e
∗
G(l) = 0 and itself.
Note that the left hand side (LHS) of (A.4) strictly decreases in e∗B(l) and the
right hand side (RHS) increases. The LHS is continuous, because l is fixed
and Vθ
(
l + λ+dλ(1−e∗B(l))+d
)
is continuous by (A.3). The RHS is continuous by
assumption.
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Condition (d) implies VB(l)−V 1B < c
′
B(1)
λ and (e) implies VB(l)−V 1B ≥ c
′
B(eˆ)
λ
for eˆ solving l + ln
(
λ+d
λ(1−eˆ)+d
)
= l1. These bounds, the continuity of (A.4)
and the Mean Value Theorem imply that there exists e∗B(l) ∈ [eˆ, 1) s.t. (A.4)
holds.
Proof of Prop. 3. (a) V 1G =
∫∞
l1
β(z)−cG(1)
λ exp
(−r z−lλ ) dz when l = ∞ based
on (A.3). When e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0 and d = 0, then j(l) = l + ln
0
1 = −∞
by (1), so Vθ(j(l)) =
βmin
r . By (A.2), condition (a) suffices for eG(l) = 1 for any
l s.t. e∗G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0.
(b) liml→∞ VB(l) = βmaxr+λ +
λβmin
r(r+λ) when l = ∞ based on (A.3). By (A.2),
condition (b) suffices for eB(l) = 0 for any l s.t. e
∗
G(l) = 1, e
∗
B(l) = 0, because
j(l) = −∞. Equilibrium behaviour in the e∗G(l) = 1, e∗B(l) = 0 region is thus
guaranteed.
(c)–(e). In the e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 region, in the absence of signals, l drifts
down by (2). At lˆ ∈ (l, l0], the probability of reaching l is exp
(∫ lˆ
l
λ(1−e∗B(z))
−λe∗B(z) dz
)
for B, because at l, signals occur at rate λ(1−e∗B(l)) and l drifts λ[e∗G(l)−e∗B(l)]
per unit of time. For G, the probability is exp
(∫ lˆ
l
λ
−λe∗B(z)dz
)
, smaller than for
B because of lower effort of avoiding jumps. The payoff conditional on reaching l
is β(l)r and conditional on not reaching, bounded by
βmin
r and
βmax
r . The discount
rate is r and the time it takes to drift from l to l is
∣∣∣∫ ll dzλ[e∗G(z)−e∗B(z)] ∣∣∣. Therefore
for any l ∈ (l, l0],
exp
(∫ l
l
−dz
e∗B(z)
)
exp
(∫ l
l
−rdz
λe∗B(z)
)
β(l)
r
+
[
1− exp
(∫ l
l
λdz
−λe∗B(z)
)]
βmax
r
≥ Vθ(l) ≥ (A.5)
exp
(∫ l
l
−dz
e∗B(z)
)
exp
(∫ l
l
−rdz
λe∗B(z)
)
β(l)
r
+
[
1− exp
(∫ l
l
λdz
−λe∗B(z)
)]
βmin
r
.
To construct the e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 part of the equilibrium, first conjecture
e∗B(l) ≥ 1 − exp (l − l1) ∀l ∈ (l, l1) so that e∗G(j(l)) = 1, e∗B(j(l)) = 0, second
show that Vθ is continuous at l, third use (c) to ensure e
∗
G(l) = 0, and fourth
use (d),(e) to ensure e∗B(l) ∈ [1− exp (l − l1) , 1), verifying the conjecture.
If e∗B(l) ≥  > 0 ∀l ∈ (l, l0], then by (A.5) and the Squeeze Theorem,
liml→l+ Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r . This and (c) imply the existence of l2 ∈ (l, l1) s.t. for all
l ∈ (l, l2], VG(l)− VG(j(l)) ≤ c
′
G(0)
λ , which by (A.2) implies eG(l) = 0.
Condition (d), liml→∞ VB(l) = βmaxr+λ +
λβmin
r(r+λ) and liml→l+ Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r imply
the existence of l3 ∈ (l, l1) s.t. for all l ∈ (l, l3], VB(l)− VB(j(l)) < c
′
B(1)
λ , which
by (A.2) implies eB(l) < 1.
Condition (e) similarly implies the existence of l4 ∈ (l, l1) s.t. for all l ∈
(l, l4], VB(l) − VB(j(l)) ≥ c
′
B(1−exp(l−l1))
λ , which by (A.2) implies eB(l) ≥ 1 −
exp (l − l1).
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Set l0 := min {l2, l3, l4}. As in the proof of Prop. 2, the bounds from con-
ditions (d),(e) and the Mean Value Theorem imply that there exists e∗B(l) ∈
[1− exp (l − l1) , 1) s.t. (A.4) holds.
Proposition 6. Fix l, l1, l ∈ R with l < l1 < l. If d > 0 and
(a) minl∈[l1,l]
{
VG(l)− β(l+ln(
d
λ+d ))
r
}
≥ c′G(1)λ ,
(b) maxl∈[l1,l]
{
VB(l)− β(l+ln(
d
λ+d ))
r
}
≤ c′B(0)λ ,
(c) β(l)r − VG(l1) < c
′
G(0)
λ ,
(d) β(l)r − β(l)r < c
′
B(1)
λ ,
(e) β(l)r − VB(l1) > c
′
B(1−d/λ−(λ+d) exp(l−l1)/λ)
λ ,
(f) l + ln
(
d
λ+d
)
< l,
where Vθ is given in (A.3), then there exists l0 ∈ (l, l1) and an equilibrium in
which
e∗B(l) > e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l ∈ (l, l0],
e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1 if l ∈ [l1, l],
e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) = 0 if l /∈ (l, l0] ∪ [l1, l].
The proof is omitted, because it is similar to that of Prop. 3: value func-
tions or bounds on them are substituted into the conditions of Prop. 2 to check
incentives. Condition (d) in Prop. 6 always holds, but is added for better com-
parability to the other propositions.
Proof of Prop. 5. The equilibrium with jump rate λ(1 − eθ) + dθ will be con-
structed using the same l, l1, l as in Prop. 6. If the Poisson rate is λ(1− eθ) +dθ
for type θ, then (1) becomes
j(l) = l + ln
(
λ(1− e∗G(l)) + dG
λ(1− e∗B(l)) + dB
)
. (A.6)
In the absence of jumps, the log likelihood ratio drift is λ[e∗G(l)−e∗B(l)]−dG+dB .
Jumps reach l1 from l in the e
∗
B(l) > e
∗
G(l) region iff e
∗
B(l) ≥ 1− dBλ −λ+dGλ exp(l−
l1), which is implied by Prop. 6 (f) holding strictly and by |dθ − d| < δ.
If dG < dB , then l is a stasis point : to the left of l and at l, the drift of the log
likelihood ratio is positive and to the right of l, negative. After reaching l, the l
process oscillates around it with infinite frequency and zero amplitude, spending
fraction w :=
dG−dB+λ liml→l+ e∗B(l)
λ liml→l+ e∗B(l)
of any time interval infinitesimally to the left
20
of l and 1−w infinitesimally to the right. The drift at l is a mixture of drifts to
the left and to the right of it, with weight w on the left-side drift. A fraction w
of the time, jumps to j−(l) := l+ ln
(
λ+dG
λ+dB
)
occur for type θ at rate λ+ dθ. A
fraction 1− w of the time, jumps to j+(l) := l + ln
(
λ+dG
λ(1−liml→l+ e∗B(l))+dB
)
> l1
occur for G at rate λ + dθ and for B at rate λ
∗
B := λ(1 − liml→l+ eB(l)) + dB .
The values of the types at l are
VG(l) =
β(l)
r + λ+ dG
+
λ+ dG
r + λ+ dG
[wVG (j−(l)) + (1− w)VG (j+(l))] ,
VB(l) =
β(l)
(λ+ dB)w + λ∗B(1− w)
+
(λ+ dB)w
(λ+ dB)w + λ∗B(1− w)
VB (j−(l)) (A.7)
+
λ∗B(1− w)
(λ+ dB)w + λ∗B(1− w)
VB (j+(l)) .
Value is continuous at l by the same argument as in the proof of Prop. 3. For
any  > 0 there exists δ > 0 s.t. if |dθ−d| < δ, then w > 1− and |l−j−(l)| < .
Then by (A.7) and the continuity of Vθ,
β(l)
r + λ+ dG
+
λ+ dG
r + λ+ dG

βmax
r
≥ VG(l)− (λ+ dG)(1− )
r + λ+ dG
[VG (j−(l)) + ],
VG(l)− (λ+ dG)(1− )
r + λ+ dG
[VG (j−(l))− ] ≥ β(l)
r + λ+ dG
+
λ+ dG
r + λ+ dG

βmin
r
,
so by the Squeeze Theorem, limdG,dB→d VG(l) =
β(l)
r . A similar argument shows
limdG,dB→d VB(l) =
β(l)
r .
At any l s.t. e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) = 0, for any T,  > 0 there exists δ > 0 s.t. if
|dθ − d| < δ, then with probability 1 − , the flow payoff remains within  of
β(l) for at least T units of time. This is because by (A.6), limdθ→d j(l) = l, and
when e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l), the drift of the log likelihood ratio is −dG + dB . Therefore
limdG,dB→d Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r .
Using (A.6) and the drift λ[e∗G(l)−e∗B(l)]−dG+dB in the HJB equation (A.1)
and solving for Vθ in the e
∗
B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1 region, (A.3) becomes
VG(l) = exp
(
− (r + dG)(l − l)
λ− dG + dB
)
VG(l)
+
∫ l
l
β(z)− cG(1) + dGVG(j(z))
λ− dG + dB exp
(
− (r + dG)(z − l)
λ− dG + dB
)
dz, (A.8)
VB(l) = exp
(
− (r + λ+ dB)(l − l)
λ− dG + dB
)
VB(l)
+
∫ l
l
β(z) + (dB + λ)VB(j(z))
λ− dG + dB exp
(
− (r + λ+ dB)(z − l)
λ− dG + dB
)
dz.
From e∗B(l) = e
∗
G(l) = 0, it follows that limdG,dB→d Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r in (A.8). From
e∗B(j(l)) = e
∗
G(j(l)) = 0, it follows that limdG,dB→d Vθ(j(l)) =
β(j(l))
r in (A.8).
Based on these, the limit of (A.8) as dθ → d is (A.3).
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Since Prop. 6 (a)–(f) hold strictly and Vθ(l) is continuous in dG, dB for any
l, there exist l0 ∈ (l, l1) and δ > 0 s.t. if |dθ − d| < δ, then Prop. 2 (a)–(f) are
satisfied. This suffices for the existence of a switched effort equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4. If {l : e∗B(l) = 0, e∗G(l) = 1} = ∅, then the result is vacu-
ously true. Suppose there exists l s.t. e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1. Define j
n(l) :=
j(jn−1(l)) and j1(l) := j(l) = l + ln
(
d
λ+d
)
. Clearly j(l)− l ∈ (−∞, 0).
Define n∗ := λ(βmax−βmin)rc′G(1) . By (A.2), e
∗
G(l) = 1 requires λ [Vθ(l)− Vθ (j(l))] ≥
c′θ(1). Since Vθ(l) ∈
[
βmin
r ,
βmax
r
]
, we have
sup
{
n ∈ N : ∃l s.t. l, j1(l), . . . , jn(l) ∈
{
lˆ : e∗B(lˆ) = 0, e
∗
G(lˆ) = 1
}}
≤ n∗.
(A.9)
Pick l1 < l s.t. for any lˆ ∈ (l1, l), e∗B(lˆ) = 0, e∗G(lˆ) = 1. By (A.9), l − l1 ≤
n∗/ ln
(
d
λ+d
)
<∞. Raise l maximally, so for any η > 0, e∗B(l+η) = e∗G(l+η) =
0. In this case, by continuity of the Vθ given in (A.3), liml→l Vθ(l) =
β(l)
r .
By definition of n∗, if e∗B(l) = 0 and e
∗
G(l) = 1, then there exists nˆ ∈ N,
nˆ < n∗+ 1, s.t. e∗B(j
nˆ(l)) = e∗G(j
nˆ(l)) = 0. Let n be the minimal such nˆ and let
l∗ = l − ν for ν > 0 small enough.
Due to the bounded β and β′ > 0, there exist N,  > 0 s.t. if |l| > N ,
then β(l) − β (jn(l)) < r. Take  = c′G(1)λ . Then there exists N > 0 s.t.
if l > N , then Vθ(l
∗) − Vθ(jn(l∗)) < c
′
G(1)
λ . Since Vθ is strictly increasing
in the e∗B(l) = 0, e
∗
G(l) = 1 region, this implies the failure of (A.2) at all
l = l∗, j1(l∗), . . . , jn−1(l∗). Thus there is no incentive for G to exert maximal
effort. This shows l ≤ N for all intervals (l1, l) on which switched efforts occur.
To show l1 ≥ −N , note that Vθ(l) < Vθ(l) = β(l)r for any l ∈ (l1, l). If
Vθ(l)− βminr < c
′
G(1)
λ , then (A.2) fails at any l ∈ (l1, l). It was shown above that
l − l1 ≤ n∗/ ln
(
d
λ+d
)
, so for G to have an incentive to exert maximal effort, it
is necessary that l1 ≥ β−1
(
rc′G(1)
λ + βmin
)
− n∗/ ln
(
d
λ+d
)
.
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